Protection of Refugee Children in India by Vijayakumar, V.
Protection of Refugee Children in India
V. Vijayakumar
Abstract
This note is an attempt to illustrate the role played by the In-
dian judiciary in protecting refugee children and their inter-
ests in the context of India not being a party to the Refugee
Convention or its Protocol. Along with this, the efforts taken
by the Supreme Court of India in bridging the gap between
India’s international obligations and domestic laws, both
treaty-based and customary, are mentioned briefly. In doing
so, the lack of focused discussion of article 22 of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child in protecting unaccompanied
and separated children and their interests is also mentioned.
The article calls for a more meaningful discussion of these is-
sues in the future.
Résumé
Cette note tente d’illustrer le rôle joué par l’appareil judiciaire
indien pour la protection des enfants réfugiés et de leurs in-
térêts, avec comme contexte, le fait que l’Inde n’est pas sig-
nataire de la Convention sur les réfugiés ou de son Protocole.
Par la même occasion, une brève mention est faite des efforts
déployés par la Cour suprême de l’Inde pour combler le fossé
séparant les obligations internationales de l’Inde et les lois
domestiques, à la fois celles fondées sur des traités que celles
découlant du droit coutumier. Ce faisant, référence est aussi
faite à l’absence de discussions sérieuses dans l’article 22 de la
Convention relative aux droits de l’enfant de la protection des
enfants non-accompagnés et séparés et de leurs intérêts. L’ar-
ticle réclame des discussions plus sérieuses sur ces sujets à
l’avenir.
Though India is not a party to the Convention on the
Status of Refugees, 1951, or its Protocol, 1967, India has ac-
ceded to a number of international human rights instru-
ments. Yet there is a gap between those international
obligations undertaken and in realizing them through the
domestic legal framework for effective implementation. Un-
der such circumstances, the Indian judiciary has been play-
ing a very important role in bridging the gap through
their decisions from time to time. The nature and ex-
tent of the international obligations, their applicabil-
ity, and the nature of reservation as well as the
absence of domestic legislation have been discussed by
the courts, in the context of constitutional rights and
human rights jurisprudence. The primary objective of
this short note is to identity some important decisions
that seek to protect the rights and interests of refugee
children. A few other important decisions of the Su-
preme Court as well as the High Courts in India are
also discussed with a view to assessing the overall effect
of those decisions in upholding human rights values in
India. The importance of article 22 and other provi-
sions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child in
upholding human rights values in India will also be
highlighted.
A
t the outset, mention must be made of Digvijay
Mote v. Government of India and others,1 in which
a public interest petition was moved before the
High Court of Karnataka. It was moved by an individual
who acted on the basis of certain reports published in the
newspaper as well as his personal visit to a school estab-
lished exclusively for accommodating the refugee chil-
dren from Sri Lanka. This school was established by an
NGO, the Bright Education Society, registered in the state
of Tamil Nadu (a province in India), in Bangalore, the
capital city of the neighbouring state of Karnataka. This
school, conceived as a boarding school, houses two hun-
dred and fifty to three hundred refugee children from Sri
Lanka exclusively. A majority of them were orphaned or
have one of the parents living in the refugee camps in
Tamil Nadu and not in a position to take care of the child.
The school is administered from funds collected from
various donors, individuals as well as organizations. The
state of Karnataka also extended its helping  hand in
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providing necessary supplies through its Ministry of Women
and Social Welfare. However, when the government of Kar-
nataka decided to stop its humanitarian assistance and the
school found itself in a difficult situation, the public interest
petition was moved before the High Court. Though rejected in
the first instance, on appeal before the same High Court,
notices were served to all the respondents including the gov-
ernment of Karnataka. On receipt of the notice from the court,
the Chief  Secretary of  the state convened  a meeting of  all
concerned and decided to continue with the humanitarian
assistance to the Sri Lankan refugee school and the same was
communicated to the court. The petition was disposed of
accordingly. However, the school continues to run into finan-
cial difficulties frequently. In the recent past, as it could not pay
the arrears for the supply of electricity, the state-owned elec-
tricity board disconnected the supply. Due to this, the boarding
school had to face all sorts of inconveniences. Once again the
same High Court was petitioned to restore the power supply.
The High Court gave specific directions to the Karnataka State
Electricity Board to resume the supply of electricity and accept
the payment of arrears in instalments from the school.2
In Khy Htoon v. State of Manipur,3 the High Court of
Guahati went to the extent of staying the deportation order
issued against eight Burmese, including children from the age
of twelve. Apart from staying the deportation order, the court
even went to the extent of releasing them from Manipur
central jail on personal bond, as they might not get any surety
to come forward, considering their country of origin. The
court went one step further and held that these refugees should
be permitted to go to New Delhi to seek refugee status from
the Office of the  United  Nations High  Commissioner  for
Refugees. Similar orders  were  also  issued by the Supreme
Court of India in Dr. Malavika Karlekar v. Union of India.4
In Narendra Bahadur v. State of Uttar Pradesh,5 the Supreme
Court of India held that the courts should be averse to striking
down a notification issued by the government for acquisition
of land on fanciful grounds based on hyper-technicality. In
this case, the notification issued under section 7(1) of the Uttar
Pradesh Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act,
1948, was assailed by stating that the land acquired was for
displaced persons and not for refugees. The Supreme Court
held that “what is needed is substantial compliance with law
and the notification satisfies  that requirement.” Thus,  the
distinction between “refugees” and  “displaced  persons” in
international law has been diluted in the context of the parti-
tion of India into two dominions in 1947 as well as in domestic
legislation. This approach of the court could also be seen in
Collector of 24 Parganas v. Lalith Mohan Mullick,6 in which the
Supreme Court has also very clearly established the objectives
of concepts such as “rehabilitation” and “public purpose”
relating to displaced persons. In this case, a notification issued
under section 4 of the West Bengal Land Development
and Planning Act for settlement and rehabilitation of
displaced persons was issued. Subsequently, a decision
was taken by the Department of Refugee Relief and
Rehabilitation, Government of West Bengal, to allot the
acquired land to a society for the establishment of a
hospital for crippled children. The Supreme Court ob-
served that:
[P]utting up of a hospital for crippled children is a public
purpose connected with the rehabilitation of displaced per-
sons. The original object of acquisition proceedings is gen-
erally termed as “resettlement of refugees” which would
mean their rehabilitation. By rehabilitation what is meant is
not to provide shelter alone. The real purpose of rehabilitation
can be achieved only if those who are sought to be rehabilitated
are provided with shelter, food and other necessary amenities
of life. To provide a hospital for the disabled and for the
crippled children of such displaced persons squarely comes
within the concept of the idea of “rehabilitation” and conse-
quently of settlement of refugees [emphasis added].
Thus, the construction of a hospital for refugee chil-
dren was held valid under the concept of “public pur-
pose” on the basis of which even private property could
be acquisitioned or requisitioned. In this case, there was
acquisition of private property for the construction of a
hospital for refugee children.
In National Human Rights Commission v. State of
Arunachal Pradesh,7 the Supreme Court of India has very
clearly established the rights of Chakma refugee children
born in the state of Arunachal Pradesh for citizenship. A
large number of children were born in India and were
entitled to Indian citizenship by birth under section 3 of
the Citizenship Act, 1955, prior to the amendment made
to it in 1987 requiring one of the parents to be an Indian
citizen. However, they also sought to be registered as
citizens under section 5 of the same act. In this case, the
Court observed that:
[B]y virtue of their long and prolonged stay in the state, the
Chakmas who migrated to, and those born in the state, seek
citizenship under the Constitution read with section 5 of the
Act (Citizenship  Act, 1955).  By refusing to forward  the
applications of the Chakmas to the Central Government, the
Deputy Collector is failing in his duty and is also preventing
the Central Government from performing its duty under the
Act and the Rules.
In this regard, the Court went further and observed
that:
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[W]e are a country governed by the Rule of Law. Our Constitution
confers certain rights on citizens. Every person is entitled to equality
before the law and the equal protection of the laws. Besides, by refusing
to forward their applications, the Chakmas are denied rights, consti-
tutional and statutory, to be considered for being registered as citizens
of India [emphasis added].
Apart from these decisions addressing the rights and inter-
ests of refugee children, the Supreme Court of India has time
and again reiterated India’s obligations under contemporary
international law based both on the provisions of the Consti-
tution and on the international instruments to which India is
a party. In M.C.Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu,8 the Supreme
Court gave a set of directions for the abolition of child labour
in Sivakasi Match Industries. Reiterating the same, the Su-
preme Court also referred to articles 3, 27(1), 31(1) and 36 of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Bandua Mukti
Morcha v. Union of India.9 The Court held that primary edu-
cation of children, in particular, children from poor, weaker
sections, Dalits and Tribes and minorities, is mandatory. The
Court also observed that the ban on employment of children
must begin with the most hazardous and intolerable activities
like slavery, bonded labour, trafficking, prostitution, pornog-
raphy, dangerous forms of labour, and the like.
Apart from the decisions mentioned above, the following
decisions would indicate the role played by the courts in
bridging  the  gap between  international obligations  under-
taken by India in protecting human rights and in realizing
them. To mention a few, the Supreme Court in Gramophone
Company of India Limited v. Birednra Pandey,10 held that
there can be no question that nations must march with the inter-
national community and the municipal law must respect rules of
international law just as nations respect international conventions.
The comity of nations requires that rules of international law may
be  accommodated  in the  municipal law even without express
legislative sanction provided they do not run into conflict with Acts
of Parliament.
In People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,11 the
Court held that “the provisions of the  Covenant which eluci-
date and go to effectuate the fundamental rights guaranteed
by our Constitution can certainly be relied upon by the courts
as facets of those fundamental rights and hence enforceable as
such.” In People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India,12
the Supreme Court went one step further and held that “the
customary principle of international law, if there is nothing
against it in the domestic sphere, would be part of the domestic
law of the land.” The court also observed that “international
law is now more focused on individuals than ever before” (em-
phasis added). In Nilabati Behra v. State of Orissa,13 the Court
went to the extent of overriding the reservation India had
on the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and held that individuals are entitled to compen-
sation even in the absence of a statutory law. In another
case, Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,14 the Supreme Court
very effectively brought the international obligations
India has undertaken to the protection of the rights of
women and put into place a set of guidelines regarding
sexual harassment in workplaces in the absence of any
specific law.
In Khudiram Chakma v. State of Arunachal Pradesh,15
the Supreme Court of India referred approvingly to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in relation to
refugees. The Court observed:
Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which speaks of the right to enjoy asylum, has to be inter-
preted in the light of the instrument as a whole, and must be
taken to mean something. It implies that although an asylum
seeker has no right to be granted admission to a foreign state,
equally a state that had granted him asylum must not later
return him to the country he came from. Moreover, the article
carries considerable moral authority and embodies the legal
prerequisite of regional declarations and instruments.
Again, the Supreme Court in C. Masilamani Mudaliar
v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami
Thirukoil16 referred to articles 1, 2(b), 3, 13,14,15(2) of
the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW) to protect the
rights of women. In doing so, the Court observed that:
Article 5(a) of CEDAW to which the Government of India
expressed reservation, does not stand in its way and in fact
Article 2(f) denudes its effect and enjoins to implement
Article (2(f) read with its obligation undertaken under Arti-
cles 3, 14 and 15 of the Convention vis-à-vis Articles 1,3,6
and 8 of the Convention of Right to Development. These
Conventions add urgency and teeth for immediate imple-
mentation.
The Court went on to observe that:
[L]aw is an instrument of social change as well as the de-
fender for social change. Article 2(e) of the CEDAW enjoins
the Supreme Court to breathe life into the dry bones of the
Constitution [emphasis added].
In Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar,17 the Supreme
Court made elaborate reference to CEDAW as well in
protecting the rights of women. Referring to the Univer-
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sal Declaration of Human Rights as the “Moral Code of Con-
duct,” the Court read those principles into the domestic juris-
prudence in awarding compensation to a foreign national, a
woman from Bangladesh.18 There are many such decisions of
the Supreme Court of India that seek to protect the rights of
citizens as well as others seeking to implement the interna-
tional obligations undertaken by India directly or imposed on
her by the customary principles of international law.
In spite of all these decisions, it is interesting to note that no
specific reference has been made by any party to a dispute, or
by the courts about the international obligations India has
undertaken under article 22 of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.19 A much closer analysis in this regard would
reveal that many other provisions of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child have also been ignored. Provisions like
article 2 on non-discrimination, article 7(2) on registration of
birth, and articles 20, 26, 28, 29, 31, 35, and 39 have not been
taken into consideration in dealing with one or more refugee
groups in India. Proper education and training of government
officials, police, custodial institutions, NGOs, and para-mili-
tary forces along with inclusion of human rights curriculum
(with a focus on children’s rights) would go a long way to
ensuring effective implementation of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child in the South Asian region.
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